How to End the Iraq War and Occupation
Source Dave Anderson
Date 07/02/19/00:16

Published on Saturday, February 17, 2007 by

Ending It: How to End the Iraq War and Occupation
by Tom Hayden


1. Stop funding a sectarian Baghdad regime based on lethal militias.

2. Support a transitional regime in Baghdad which will concur in a plan for US military withdrawal. Set a deadline of six months to one year.

3. Begin a diplomatic offensive to assure regional and international attention to remaining security, reconstruction and reconciliation issues.

4. Make Congressional funding contingent on adoption of such a plan.


Despite promises to the contrary, the US has placed in power a sectarian coalition of Shi’as and Kurds who wield power through the Badr militia and the peshmerga. The coalition is carrying out ethnic cleansing in the name of security. Baghdad, once a mixed city of five million people, is dominated by a huge Shi’a majority. Fifty of 51 members of the Baghdad governing council are Shi’a. Sunnis have fled by the tens of thousands, or live in isolated and besieged enclaves. While all sides are employing abhorrent tactics, the Americans are the backbone of a majority-Shi’a regime whose police, commandos and security forces, infiltrated by the Badr brigades, routinely drag Sunnis from their homes, torture and execute them, or detain large numbers in a network of secret prisons accountable only to the Interior Ministry. American officials who have trained and funded these forces now admit they are out of control. But these Frankensteins are an American responsibility.

These are the facts on the ground, in stark contradiction to the rhetorical promises of officials in Washington and Baghdad, not to mention the UN’s language authorizing the US-UK occupation of Iraq.

Members of Congress can focus on, and criticize, this tragic outcome in public hearings during the next several months.

Congress can use its constitutional and budgetary powers to prevent the propping up of this brutal sectarian regime.

All recent surveys indicate that majorities of both Sunni and Shi’a support the right of armed resistance against American forces. All surveys show that the vast majority of Iraqis want the US to set a deadline for withdrawal. At least 131 members of the Iraqi parliament have petitioned for a withdrawal deadline. Instead of accepting the will of the people and the parliament, the US continues to recognize, fund and militarily support a tiny sectarian clique in power. The White House national security adviser, in a leaked memorandum, has suggested reshaping the Baghdad regime by offering money to compliant Iraqi political factions.

Instead of propping up a sectarian war regime, why not support a transitional peace regime reflecting the aspirations of most Iraqis?

This option has been considered and rejected for years. It is time that it be debated by the new Congress.

New York Times, Jan. 10, 2005- One possibility quietly discussed inside the administration is whether the new Iraqi government might ask the United States forees to begin to leave – what one senior State Department official calls ‘the Philippine option’, a reference to when the Philippines asked American forces to pull out a decade ago. Few officials will talk publicly about that possibility .

Congress needs to make clear that further support for a sectarian regime which employs torture is unacceptable. That message will encourage the replacement of the present Shi’a-Kurdish coalition with a transitional one chosen by the Iraqi parliament for a period of two years, which would request and arrange an orderly withdrawal of American troops and call a regional and international conference to consider ways of filling any vacuum created by the US departure. The transitional regime would also complete work on a reconciliation plan including amnesties, de-Baathification, and the fair distribution of oil revenues. Cease-fires in place should be agreed by the multiple militias, limiting their functions to neighborhood security. The full demobilization of existing militias should be an aspirational goal, as it was in Northern Ireland, not a precondition to the process.

Regional and international diplomacy, with the new Iraqi government fully represented, should take up the questions of the need for international peacekeepers, stabilization agreements among the bordering countries, and renewal of reconstruction funding with an emphasis on Iraqi contractors and Iraqi jobs. The Baker-Hamilton Report provides an initial roadmap for the diplomacy required.

The assumption of the diplomatic offensive should be that most parties in the regional are desirous of a gradual and peaceful stabilizing of Iraq to prevent the refugee crisis and the war itself from spilling over their borders into a regional conflagration.

The US should appoint a peace envoy [like George Mitchell in the case of Ireland] or support the appointment of an envoy from an international conference, to carry out the transition from a military model to one of conflict resolution.

As former CIA director John Deutch has explained, the US needs to initiate diplomacy with Iran in particular, since Iran is the only country capable of complicating the US withdrawal.

Respecting the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people is the only option that the US has not been tried. Instead the US military occupation is attempting to coerce Iraqis into supporting an occupation for as long as another decade. The disastrous and mistaken assumption of every plan put forward, from the White House to the Baker-Hamilton Report, is that there is an Iraqi “state” and Iraqi military that must “stand up” before we will “stand down.” The potential disaster is that under proposals like Baker-Hamilton, or that of the Center for American Progress, American troops will be left behind in training roles as our combat mission winds down. But those American trainers may be at extreme risk if they are left amidst an Iraqi army or police force that is sectarian by unit, doesn’t show up for work, is disinclined to fight outside their neighborhoods, and is expected to defeat an insurgency that could not be overcome by 150,000 American troops.

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