As US power fades, it can't find friends to take on Iran
Source Dave Anderson
Date 07/02/03/20:58

from The London Guardian

As US power fades, it can't find friends to take on Iran
Washington has exaggerated Tehran's capabilities and intentions in Iraq. It is
confused and frustrated

Jonathan Steele
Friday February 02 2007

THE SHADOWY outlines of a new US strategy towards Iran are exercising diplomats
and experts around the Middle East and in the west. The US says Iranian
personnel are training and arming anti-US forces inside Iraq, and it will not
hesitate to kill them. It is sending a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf,
doubling its force projection there. It is calling on Europeans to tighten
sanctions on Iran until Tehran suspends its uranium enrichment programme.

Is the US rattling the sabre in advance of an attack on Iran? Or is it merely
rattling its cage, as it pretends still to be a power in the region in spite of
being locked into an unwinnable war in Iraq? The only certainty is that Bush's
strategy of calling for democratisation in the Middle East is over. Washington
has had to abandon the neocon dream of turning Iraq into a beacon of secular
liberal democracy. It is no longer pressing for reform in other Arab states.

On her recent trip to Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf, Condoleezza Rice said little
about democracy. Her pitch was old-fashioned realpolitik as she tried to create
a regional counterweight to Iran's influence. Gary Sick, a former National
Security Council expert, argues that Washington's return to balance-of-power
considerations is designed to create an informal anti-Iranian alliance of the
US, Israel and the Sunni Arab states. The aim is partly to divert attention
from the catastrophe of Iraq. It also reduces Israel's isolation by suggesting
Sunni Arab states have a common interest in confronting Iran, whatever their
disagreements over Palestine.

Other American experts argue that Iranian influence should not be confused with
Shia influence. The US blunder in invading Iraq and opening the way for Shia
Islamists to control its government created an unexpected opportunity for Iran.
But it does not follow that Shia movements in other Arab states have grown
stronger or that the arc of Shia radicalism that King Abdullah of Jordan has
talked of is anything more than a figment of his imagination. The Shia
minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are showing no signs of revolt. On the
contrary, Saudi Shias are reported to be fearful of a backlash from the Sunni
majority if sectarian threat-mongering continues. Highlighting sectarian
identities has turned into a galloping cancer in Iraq, and it would be a
disaster if the US seeks to export these tensions into the wider Middle East.

Even in Iraq there are limits to Iran's role. The eight-year war between the two
countries in the 1980s showed that Iraqi Shias put their Arab and Iraqi identity
above the religious rituals they share with Iranians. Moqtada al-Sadr, the
cleric who commands one of the main Iraqi militias, frequently boasts of his
Iraqi nationalism and the fact that his father, a distinguished ayatollah,
remained in opposition in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein years rather than
fleeing, as other Iraqi Shia clerics did, to the protection of Tehran or

The US claims Iran has increased its subversion in Iraq in recent months. The US
has a record of self-serving and false intelligence on Iraq but, even if true,
Iran's actions cannot make much difference to the problems the US is facing.
The sectarian violence is perpetrated largely by Iraqis on Iraqis. If outsiders
provoke it, they are mainly Sunni jihadis loyal to al-Qaida. As for attacks on
US forces, these come primarily in Sunni areas or the mixed province of Diyala.
Some US officials now hint that Iranians may be involved in these areas too.
Links between Iran and Iraq's Sunni insurgents would be new, but marginal.

The real purpose of Washington's heightened talk of Iranian subversion seems to
be twofold. The administration is playing the blame game. When the "who lost
Iraq?" debate develops in earnest as the presidential election contest hots up,
Bush's people will name its fall guys. Number one will be the Democrats, for
failing to fund the war adequately and allowing the "enemy" to take comfort
from the sapping of American will. Number two will be Iran for its alleged
arming of militias and insurgents. Number three will be Syria for allowing
suicide bombers through Damascus airport and into Iraq.

The second purpose of Washington's anti-Iranian claims, as the former national
security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently suggested, is to prepare a case
for a US military strike on Iran. It will be described as defensive, just as
the first attacks on North Vietnam two generations ago were falsely said to be
an answer to the other side's aggression.

There could be a third aim: a desire to influence the internal Iranian debate. A
senior US official stated in London this week that the Iranian government was a
monolith and "we try to discern differences within the Iranian regime at our
peril". That may not be the majority view within the administration. Ratcheting
up accusations against Iran's revolutionary guards who are close to President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be a device to make a case for moderates like the
former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. He appears to favour a deal with
Washington rather than confrontation.

The safest conclusion is that Washington remains confused about what Iran is
doing, and frustrated by its own inability to find allies to support a
response. All options are being prepared, along with their "justifications".
The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual survey rightly
pointed out this week that US power is fading. It can shape an agenda but not
implement it globally.

Two stark new events prove that. One was the meeting between the Saudi and
Iranian security chiefs to try to stop Lebanon sliding back into civil war.
This showed Iran can be a force for regional stability, and that Saudi Arabia
is resisting US efforts to isolate Tehran. The other was President Jacques
Chirac's comment that it would not matter if Iran developed a nuclear bomb or
two as they could not be used productively. Described as a gaffe since it broke
ranks with Washington, it expressed the views of many Europeans (as well as the
contradiction inherent in the French and British nuclear arsenals), since the
French president added that the bigger problem was the push for other nations
to follow suit.

As Washington's neocons go into eclipse and the realpolitikers dither, Britain
and other European governments need to be far clearer in public than they have
so far been. They should point out that the dispute with Iran is not as
monumental as Washington claims. Fomenting new divisions in the Middle East or
resorting to force are cures far worse than the disease.

Copyright Guardian News and Media Limited

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