councilor.org
| Source | Paul |
| Date | 06/12/07/23:15 |
| IS IT JUST me? I keep hearing reported that the Baker Report calls for
"all U.S. combat troops to leave Iraq by 2008". That is NOT at all what it says. Nor is this the strategy that underlies the Report. The U.S. may be going in a very different direction. 1) In the Report's view all U.S. "combat brigades" (i.e. as self-contained units) would merely be administratively dissolved by 2008. But after 2008 about half the "combat troops" would remain - *indefinitely* - either reflagged as "embedded" in Iraqi combat brigades, or operating in free standing units focusing on combating al-Quada (see pp 71-72). About half the troops not directly in combat would also remain after 2008 - indefinitely - for "training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue" as well as "intelligence and support". This is estimated to amount to 70,000 to 80,000 troops (as compared to 140,000 today). See New York Times: nytimes.com/2006/12/06/world/middleeast/06report_summary.html The Study Group opposed ANY timetable for the withdrawal of this half of the U.S. combat troops (p.67). 2) There appears to be a clear strategy behind this approach. The U.S. troops will hunker down and wait out the Iraqi civil war. Their justification for their inaction/ineffectiveness will be that they are "embedded" with those elements of the Iraqi national army that do not dissolve into the civil war - and these remaining Iraqi brigades troops firmly intend to remain mostly in their barracks during that war. At the same time, crack U.S. combat troops, operating independently, will continue to try to keep al-Quada in check (but without the need to take casualties by holding territory or restoring control). By implication it is anticipated that, at some point, the warring sides of the civil war will simply wear themselves down, and be resigned to an accommodation that reflects the balance of forces - also accepting, in their exhaustion and horror at the massacre, the Pax Americana. The smaller footprint with far fewer U.S. casualties should buy enough time in the U.S, for the extended wait. [This is, in fact, similar to the scenario that was played out in the first 10 years of the Lebanese Civil War - a core of the Lebanese Army remained intact (and mostly in their barracks) from 1975 until February 1984. The army remained largely neutral and despite the dominance of Christian officers, Muslim and Druze troops stayed in the Lebanese national army until the same month as the final the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines. A further blow to the Army's neutrality came in 1987 when its Christian Commander (General Aoun, who is today aligned with Hezbollah and Syria) accepted the Presidency of the country contrary to the National Pact. But the relevant point that remains in most people's mind is that of an army and a facade of a national government that remain for a long time outside a civil war. And the ultimate acceptance of the foreign Syrian control as a lesser of evils.] 3) For a stalemate scenario to the civil war, additional outside parties must not intervene and a balance of forces must be maintained. This will require considerable cooperation from Iran, Syria, et al and concessions to them (which the Report emphasizes). Under today's conditions it will probably also require some tilting towards those Sunni elements that do not have al-Quada links, as they are the weaker party (and the Report also foreshadows such a tilt). 4) The consequence is potentially a very bloody indefinite civil war that the U.S. subtlety prevents either side from winning until the U.S. forces emerge as the only ones left standing. This is also very risky - so a brightly marked exit strategy is offered. It is said that if the Iraqi government does not meet the U.S. milestones (which they will not) the U.S. reserves the right, at a time of its choosing, to withdraw unilaterally (recommendations 40 & 41). All prejudice should fall to the Iraqis (and perhaps to those governments who did not lend support). To key parts of the U.S. elite an exit strategy is a part of what has been missing for 3 years. There has been a great relief to see the Iraq war described in honest language and to see Bush personally rebuked. But we must look closely at the objectives and strategy now proposed. It seems to me, this is a strategy that hopes to: - prolong U.S. military involvement indefinitely - buy time for that involvement at home, hopefully past the 2008 elections; - put the civil war on an open ended basis, without U.S. accountability for the result; - maintain ultimate U.S. control in Iraq in key areas. |
Copyright (c) 1998, Joongpil Cho