Book on suicide terrorism
Source Seth Sandronsky
Date 05/07/21/15:30
July 18, 2005 Issue
Copyright © 2005 The American Conservative
The Logic of Suicide Terrorism
It’s the occupation, not the fundamentalism

Last month, Scott McConnell caught up with Associate Professor Robert Pape
of the University of Chicago, whose book on suicide terrorism, Dying to Win,
is beginning to receive wide notice. Pape has found that the most common
American perceptions about who the terrorists are and what motivates them
are off by a wide margin. In his office is the world’s largest database of
information about suicide terrorists, rows and rows of manila folders
containing articles and biographical snippets in dozens of languages
compiled by Pape and teams of graduate students, a trove of data that has
been sorted and analyzed and which underscores the great need for
reappraising the Bush administration’s current strategy. Below are excerpts
from a conversation with the man who knows more about suicide terrorists
than any other American.

The American Conservative: Your new book, Dying to Win, has a subtitle: The
Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Can you just tell us generally on what the book
is based, what kind of research went into it, and what your findings were?

Robert Pape: Over the past two years, I have collected the first complete
database of every suicide-terrorist attack around the world from 1980 to
early 2004. This research is conducted not only in English but also in
native-language sources—Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, and Tamil, and others—so
that we can gather information not only from newspapers but also from
products from the terrorist community. The terrorists are often quite proud
of what they do in their local communities, and they produce albums and all
kinds of other information that can be very helpful to understand
suicide-terrorist attacks.

This wealth of information creates a new picture about what is motivating
suicide terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism is not as closely associated with
suicide terrorism as many people think. The world leader in suicide
terrorism is a group that you may not be familiar with: the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka.

This is a Marxist group, a completely secular group that draws from the
Hindu families of the Tamil regions of the country. They invented the famous
suicide vest for their suicide assassination of Rajiv Ghandi in May 1991.
The Palestinians got the idea of the suicide vest from the Tamil Tigers.

TAC: So if Islamic fundamentalism is not necessarily a key variable behind
these groups, what is?

RP: The central fact is that overwhelmingly suicide-terrorist attacks are
not driven by religion as much as they are by a clear strategic objective:
to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory
that the terrorists view as their homeland. From Lebanon to Sri Lanka to
Chechnya to Kashmir to the West Bank, every major suicide-terrorist
campaign—over 95 percent of all the incidents—has had as its central
objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw.

TAC: That would seem to run contrary to a view that one heard during the
American election campaign, put forth by people who favor Bush’s policy.
That is, we need to fight the terrorists over there, so we don’t have to
fight them here.

RP: Since suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation and
not Islamic fundamentalism, the use of heavy military force to transform
Muslim societies over there, if you would, is only likely to increase the
number of suicide terrorists coming at us.

Since 1990, the United States has stationed tens of thousands of ground
troops on the Arabian Peninsula, and that is the main mobilization appeal of
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. People who make the argument that it is a good
thing to have them attacking us over there are missing that suicide
terrorism is not a supply-limited phenomenon where there are just a few
hundred around the world willing to do it because they are religious
fanatics. It is a demand-driven phenomenon. That is, it is driven by the
presence of foreign forces on the territory that the terrorists view as
their homeland. The operation in Iraq has stimulated suicide terrorism and
has given suicide terrorism a new lease on life.

TAC: If we were to back up a little bit before the invasion of Iraq to what
happened before 9/11, what was the nature of the agitprop that Osama bin
Laden and al-Qaeda were putting out to attract people?

RP: Osama bin Laden’s speeches and sermons run 40 and 50 pages long. They
begin by calling tremendous attention to the presence of tens of thousands
of American combat forces on the Arabian Peninsula.

In 1996, he went on to say that there was a grand plan by the United
States—that the Americans were going to use combat forces to conquer Iraq,
break it into three pieces, give a piece of it to Israel so that Israel
could enlarge its country, and then do the same thing to Saudi Arabia. As
you can see, we are fulfilling his prediction, which is of tremendous help
in his mobilization appeals.

TAC: The fact that we had troops stationed on the Arabian Peninsula was not
a very live issue in American debate at all. How many Saudis and other
people in the Gulf were conscious of it?

RP: We would like to think that if we could keep a low profile with our
troops that it would be okay to station them in foreign countries. The truth
is, we did keep a fairly low profile. We did try to keep them away from
Saudi society in general, but the key issue with American troops is their
actual combat power. Tens of thousands of American combat troops, married
with air power, is a tremendously powerful tool.

Now, of course, today we have 150,000 troops on the Arabian Peninsula, and
we are more in control of the Arabian Peninsula than ever before.

TAC: If you were to break down causal factors, how much weight would you put
on a cultural rejection of the West and how much weight on the presence of
American troops on Muslim territory?

RP: The evidence shows that the presence of American troops is clearly the
pivotal factor driving suicide terrorism.

If Islamic fundamentalism were the pivotal factor, then we should see some
of the largest Islamic fundamentalist countries in the world, like Iran,
which has 70 million people—three times the population of Iraq and three
times the population of Saudi Arabia—with some of the most active groups in
suicide terrorism against the United States. However, there has never been
an al-Qaeda suicide terrorist from Iran, and we have no evidence that there
are any suicide terrorists in Iraq from Iran.

Sudan is a country of 21 million people. Its government is extremely Islamic
fundamentalist. The ideology of Sudan was so congenial to Osama bin Laden
that he spent three years in Sudan in the 1990s. Yet there has never been an
al-Qaeda suicide terrorist from Sudan.

I have the first complete set of data on every al-Qaeda suicide terrorist
from 1995 to early 2004, and they are not from some of the largest Islamic
fundamentalist countries in the world. Two thirds are from the countries
where the United States has stationed heavy combat troops since 1990.

Another point in this regard is Iraq itself. Before our invasion, Iraq never
had a suicide-terrorist attack in its history. Never. Since our invasion,
suicide terrorism has been escalating rapidly with 20 attacks in 2003, 48 in
2004, and over 50 in just the first five months of 2005. Every year that the
United States has stationed 150,000 combat troops in Iraq, suicide terrorism
has doubled.

TAC: So your assessment is that there are more suicide terrorists or
potential suicide terrorists today than there were in March 2003?

RP: I have collected demographic data from around the world on the 462
suicide terrorists since 1980 who completed the mission, actually killed
themselves. This information tells us that most are walk-in volunteers. Very
few are criminals. Few are actually longtime members of a terrorist group.
For most suicide terrorists, their first experience with violence is their
very own suicide-terrorist attack.

There is no evidence there were any suicide-terrorist organizations lying in
wait in Iraq before our invasion. What is happening is that the suicide
terrorists have been produced by the invasion.

TAC: Do we know who is committing suicide terrorism in Iraq? Are they
primarily Iraqis or walk-ins from other countries in the region?

RP: Our best information at the moment is that the Iraqi suicide terrorists
are coming from two groups—Iraqi Sunnis and Saudis—the two populations most
vulnerable to transformation by the presence of large American combat troops
on the Arabian Peninsula. This is perfectly consistent with the strategic
logic of suicide terrorism.

TAC: Does al-Qaeda have the capacity to launch attacks on the United States,
or are they too tied down in Iraq? Or have they made a strategic decision
not to attack the United States, and if so, why?

RP: Al-Qaeda appears to have made a deliberate decision not to attack the
United States in the short term. We know this not only from the pattern of
their attacks but because we have an actual al-Qaeda planning document found
by Norwegian intelligence. The document says that al-Qaeda should not try to
attack the continent of the United States in the short term but instead
should focus its energies on hitting America’s allies in order to try to
split the coalition.

What the document then goes on to do is analyze whether they should hit
Britain, Poland, or Spain. It concludes that they should hit Spain just
before the March 2004 elections because, and I am quoting almost verbatim:
Spain could not withstand two, maximum three, blows before withdrawing from
the coalition, and then others would fall like dominoes.

That is exactly what happened. Six months after the document was produced,
al-Qaeda attacked Spain in Madrid. That caused Spain to withdraw from the
coalition. Others have followed. So al-Qaeda certainly has demonstrated the
capacity to attack and in fact they have done over 15 suicide-terrorist
attacks since 2002, more than all the years before 9/11 combined. Al-Qaeda
is not weaker now. Al-Qaeda is stronger.

TAC: What would constitute a victory in the War on Terror or at least an
improvement in the American situation?

RP: For us, victory means not sacrificing any of our vital interests while
also not having Americans vulnerable to suicide-terrorist attacks. In the
case of the Persian Gulf, that means we should pursue a strategy that
secures our interest in oil but does not encourage the rise of a new
generation of suicide terrorists.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, the United States secured its interest in oil
without stationing a single combat soldier on the Arabian Peninsula.
Instead, we formed an alliance with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which we can now
do again. We relied on numerous aircraft carriers off the coast of the
Arabian Peninsula, and naval air power now is more effective not less. We
also built numerous military bases so that we could move large numbers of
ground forces to the region quickly if a crisis emerged.

That strategy, called “offshore balancing,” worked splendidly against Saddam
Hussein in 1990 and is again our best strategy to secure our interest in oil
while preventing the rise of more suicide terrorists.

TAC: Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders also talked about the
“Crusaders-Zionist alliance,” and I wonder if that, even if we weren’t in
Iraq, would not foster suicide terrorism. Even if the policy had helped
bring about a Palestinian state, I don’t think that would appease the more
hardcore opponents of Israel.

RP: I not only study the patterns of where suicide terrorism has occurred
but also where it hasn’t occurred. Not every foreign occupation has produced
suicide terrorism. Why do some and not others? Here is where religion
matters, but not quite in the way most people think. In virtually every
instance where an occupation has produced a suicide-terrorist campaign,
there has been a religious difference between the occupier and the occupied
community. That is true not only in places such as Lebanon and in Iraq today
but also in Sri Lanka, where it is the Sinhala Buddhists who are having a
dispute with the Hindu Tamils.

When there is a religious difference between the occupier and the occupied,
that enables terrorist leaders to demonize the occupier in especially
vicious ways. Now, that still requires the occupier to be there. Absent the
presence of foreign troops, Osama bin Laden could make his arguments but
there wouldn’t be much reality behind them. The reason that it is so
difficult for us to dispute those arguments is because we really do have
tens of thousands of combat soldiers sitting on the Arabian Peninsula.

TAC: Has the next generation of anti-American suicide terrorists already
been created? Is it too late to wind this down, even assuming your analysis
is correct and we could de-occupy Iraq?

RP: Many people worry that once a large number of suicide terrorists have
acted that it is impossible to wind it down. The history of the last 20
years, however, shows the opposite. Once the occupying forces withdraw from
the homeland territory of the terrorists, they often stop—and often on a

In Lebanon, for instance, there were 41 suicide-terrorist attacks from 1982
to 1986, and after the U.S. withdrew its forces, France withdrew its forces,
and then Israel withdrew to just that six-mile buffer zone of Lebanon, they
virtually ceased. They didn’t completely stop, but there was no campaign of
suicide terrorism. Once Israel withdrew from the vast bulk of Lebanese
territory, the suicide terrorists did not follow Israel to Tel Aviv.

This is also the pattern of the second Intifada with the Palestinians. As
Israel is at least promising to withdraw from Palestinian-controlled
territory (in addition to some other factors), there has been a decline of
that ferocious suicide-terrorist campaign. This is just more evidence that
withdrawal of military forces really does diminish the ability of the
terrorist leaders to recruit more suicide terrorists.

That doesn’t mean that the existing suicide terrorists will not want to keep
going. I am not saying that Osama bin Laden would turn over a new leaf and
suddenly vote for George Bush. There will be a tiny number of people who are
still committed to the cause, but the real issue is not whether Osama bin
Laden exists. It is whether anybody listens to him. That is what needs to
come to an end for Americans to be safe from suicide terrorism.

TAC: There have been many kinds of non-Islamic suicide terrorists, but have
there been Christian suicide terrorists?

RP: Not from Christian groups per se, but in Lebanon in the 1980s, of those
suicide attackers, only eight were Islamic fundamentalists. Twenty-seven
were Communists and Socialists. Three were Christians.

TAC: Has the IRA used suicide terrorism?

RP: The IRA did not. There were IRA members willing to commit suicide—the
famous hunger strike was in 1981. What is missing in the IRA case is not the
willingness to commit suicide, to kill themselves, but the lack of a
suicide-terrorist attack where they try to kill others.

If you look at the pattern of violence in the IRA, almost all of the killing
is front-loaded to the 1970s and then trails off rather dramatically as you
get through the mid-1980s through the 1990s. There is a good reason for
that, which is that the British government, starting in the mid-1980s, began
to make numerous concessions to the IRA on the basis of its ordinary
violence. In fact, there were secret negotiations in the 1980s, which then
led to public negotiations, which then led to the Good Friday Accords. If
you look at the pattern of the IRA, this is a case where they actually got
virtually everything that they wanted through ordinary violence.

The purpose of a suicide-terrorist attack is not to die. It is the kill, to
inflict the maximum number of casualties on the target society in order to
compel that target society to put pressure on its government to change
policy. If the government is already changing policy, then the whole point
of suicide terrorism, at least the way it has been used for the last 25
years, doesn’t come up.

TAC: Are you aware of any different strategic decision made by al-Qaeda to
change from attacking American troops or ships stationed at or near the Gulf
to attacking American civilians in the United States?

RP: I wish I could say yes because that would then make the people reading
this a lot more comfortable.

The fact is not only in the case of al-Qaeda, but in suicide-terrorist
campaigns in general, we don’t see much evidence that suicide-terrorist
groups adhere to a norm of attacking military targets in some circumstances
and civilians in others.

In fact, we often see that suicide-terrorist groups routinely attack both
civilian and military targets, and often the military targets are off-duty
policemen who are unsuspecting. They are not really prepared for battle.

The reasons for the target selection of suicide terrorists appear to be much
more based on operational rather than normative criteria. They appear to be
looking for the targets where they can maximize the number of casualties.

In the case of the West Bank, for instance, there is a pattern where Hamas
and Islamic Jihad use ordinary guerrilla attacks, not suicide attacks,
mainly to attack settlers. They use suicide attacks to penetrate into Israel
proper. Over 75 percent of all the suicide attacks in the second Intifada
were against Israel proper and only 25 percent on the West Bank itself.

TAC: What do you think the chances are of a weapon of mass destruction being
used in an American city?

RP: I think it depends not exclusively, but heavily, on how long our combat
forces remain in the Persian Gulf. The central motive for anti-American
terrorism, suicide terrorism, and catastrophic terrorism is response to
foreign occupation, the presence of our troops. The longer our forces stay
on the ground in the Arabian Peninsula, the greater the risk of the next
9/11, whether that is a suicide attack, a nuclear attack, or a biological

July 18, 2005 Issue

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