councilor.org
| Source | D. Ohmans |
| Date | 99/05/01/21:25 |
| /* Written 9:41 AM May 2, 1998 by jshell@netcom.com in igc:labr.all */ /* ---------- "Internet vs. MAI" ---------- */ > Financial Times THURSDAY APRIL 30 1998 > > Network guerrillas > > How the growing power of lobby groups and their use the Internet is > changing the nature of international economic negotiations. By Guy de > Jonquieres > > There is a memorable scene in the film Butch Cassidy and the Sundance > Kid when the outlaw heroes are hounded for days by a bunch of armed > men on horseback. After failing to shake off their mysterious > pursuers, one of the hunted men asks despairingly: "Who are these > guys?" > > Similar fear and bewilderment have seized governments of > industrialised countries as they struggle to draft rules for the > treatment of foreign investment. To their consternation, their efforts > have been ambushed by a horde of vigilantes whose motives and methods > are only dimly understood in most national capitals. > > This week the horde claimed its first success and some think it could > fundamentally alter the way international economic agreements are > negotiated. > > The target of their attacks was the Multilateral Agreement on > Investment (MAI) being negotiated at the Organisation for Economic > Co-operation and Development, the attackers a loose coalition of > non-government organisations (NGOs) from across the political > spectrum. They included trade unions, environmental and human rights > lobbyists and pressure groups opposed to globalisation. > > The opponents' decisive weapon is the internet. Operating from around > the world via web sites, they have condemned the proposed agreement as > a secret conspiracy to ensure global domination by multinational > companies, and mobilised an international movement of grass-roots > resistance. > > This week, they drew blood. Unnerved by the campaign against the MAI, > OECD ministers interrupted the negotiations for six months in a > belated effort to rally support for the proposed agreement among > politicians and voters at home. > > Does it matter? Postponing the agreement may make little difference > for the maligned MAI is a paper tiger. Trumpeted as a historic > initiative in 1995, flawed preparatory work and bitter disagreements > among negotiators have thwarted its main aims anyway, such as relaxing > national investment restrictions. > > Nonetheless, the unexpected success of the MAI's detractors in winning > the public relations battle and placing governments on the defensive > has set alarm bells ringing. "This episode is a turning point," says a > veteran trade diplomat. "It means we have to rethink our approach to > international economic and trade negotiations." > > The central lesson is that the growing demands for greater openness > and accountability that many governments face at home are spilling > over into the international arena. That makes it harder for > negotiators to do deals behind closed doors and submit them for > rubber-stamping by parliaments. Instead, they face pressure to gain > wider popular legitimacy for their actions by explaining and defending > them in public. > > There are signs these trends could affect many international economic > agreements, including those involving the World Bank and International > Monetary Fund. But nowhere are the lessons of the MAI affair likely to > be studied more intently than at the World Trade Organisation. Born > out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (a highly technical > body), the WTO is emerging as the pre-eminent forum for global > economic rule-making. > > Its task is complicated by three closely-related trends: > * The threat of "globalisation backlash", as voters in the US and > many other countries blame social and economic insecurity on free > trade and open markets. > > * The extension of trade liberalisation beyond border barriers, such > as tariffs and quotas, into areas that were until recently > regarded as national policy preserves. > > As a result, trade liberalisation impinges far more directly than ever > on ordinary people's lives, and risks stirring up popular resentment > when it conflicts with sensitivities over issues such as environmental > and food safety standards. > * The growing reach of the WTO's disputes settlement procedures. > Critics allege that the body's increased power to enforce world > trade law puts countries' sovereignty at the mercy of a judicial > process that lies beyond national control. Defenders of the WTO > reject such criticisms as inaccurate and ill-informed. But some > admit the organisation and its members are paying the price for > acting with unnecessary secrecy. > > The system is already fraying at the edges, partly under pressure from > its own members. Governments involved in controversial trade dispute > cases regularly "leak" confidential interim rulings by WTO panels. WTO > chief Renato Ruggiero says that unless disclosure rules are reformed, > the organisation's credibility will be undermined. > > A US-led debate is under way on opening the doors wider. The WTO has > equipped its new council chamber with a public gallery and invited > representatives of more than 150 NGOs to its ministerial meeting next > month. Some diplomats favour making disputes panel hearings public. > > However, it is uncertain whether such moves will be enough to satisfy > the critics. Most officials admit they are in a dilemma over how to > deal with the NGOs' demands, and how to assess their political > strength. > > One problem is deciding which organisations to listen to, and whom > they represent. Governments agree that many such groups hold views > that reflect a broad swathe of public opinion. But they also believe > much pressure is exercised by fringe movements that espouse extreme > positions, with little public support. The trouble is, as officials > concede, that good organisation and strong finances enable such groups > to wield much influence with the media and members of national > parliaments. > > The desire to neutralise the impact of such lobbying may push > governments to work more energetically to drum up business support for > liberalisation agreements. The OECD's failure to do so in the case of > the MAI is an important reason for its problems. > > Business lobbies which trade negotiators have traditionally suspected > of being mainly interested in preserving protection are becoming more > active as proponents of free trade. Strong support from industry > leaders on both sides of the Atlantic played a big role in WTO > agreements last year to eliminate information technology tariffs and > open global financial services markets to more competition. > > Nonetheless, striking the balance between wider public consultation > and capitulation to lobby groups will not be easy. Some diplomats fear > that if they concede too much they will be unable to resist demands > for direct participation by lobby groups in WTO decisions which would > violate one of the body's central principles. > > "This is the place where governments collude in private against their > domestic pressure groups," says a former WTO official. "Allowing NGOs > in could open the doors to European farmers and all kinds of lobbyists > opposed to free trade." > > He and other trade experts fear the result would be to paralyse the > WTO's effectiveness as an engine for freeing trade and turn it into a > happy hunting ground for special interests. > > However, free trade advocates are aware that the MAI affair is likely > to mean they will have to fight harder to keep the WTO's mission > intact. "The NGOs have tasted blood," says one. "They'll be back for > more." > > ** NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material > is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest > in receiving the included information for research and educational > purposes. ** > > -- > For MAI-not subscription information, posting guidelines and > links to other MAI sites please see http://mai.flora.org/ |
Copyright (c) 1998, Joongpil Cho